2025 IL App (3d) 240699-U

Order filed May 9, 2025

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

2025

In re MARRIAGE OF	)	Appeal from the Circuit Court
	)	of the 18th Judicial Circuit,
SARAH KIDDER-NGUYEN,	)	Du Page County, Illinois,
	)	
Petitioner-Appellee,	)	Appeal No. 3-24-0699
	)	Circuit No. 23-DC-593
v.	)	
	)	Honorable
ANH NGUYEN,	)	Kenton J. Skarin,
	)	Judge, presiding.
Respondent-Appellant.	)	
	)	

JUSTICE HETTEL delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Peterson and Bertani concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶ 1 *Held*: We affirm the circuit court's order regarding the issue of school selection for the parties' two minor children.

¶ 2 On December 3, 2024, the circuit court of Du Page County entered a judgment of dissolution of marriage between petitioner, Sarah Kidder-Nguyen, and respondent, Anh Nguyen. That same day, the court also entered a separate order requiring the parties' two minor children to

be enrolled in the Downers Grove public school system beginning January 2025. For the following reasons, we affirm.

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 A. General Background

¶ 5 The parties were married on February 5, 2011, and have two children: W.N., born in March 2013, and G.N., born in December 2014. On June 30, 2023, Sarah filed a petition for dissolution of marriage. The circuit court subsequently appointed Andrew Cores as the children's guardian *ad litem*, and, on May 20, 2024, scheduled the matter for bench trial in October of that year.

¶ 6 Throughout the marriage, the parties and their children resided in Hinsdale, Illinois and the children attended the University of Chicago Laboratory School (Lab) located in Chicago, Illinois. Sarah later relocated to Downers Grove, Illinois, and, on August 1, 2024, she filed a motion for permission to enroll the children at Fairmount Elementary School (Fairmount), located in Downers Grove, for the 2024-25 school year. In his response to the motion, Anh requested that the children remain at Lab. On October 10, 2024, the circuit court entered an order that awarded the parties equal decision-making responsibility regarding the children's education but reserved the issue of school selection for the future trial (allocation order).

¶ 7 B. Bench Trial

¶ 8 Trial was conducted on October 22 through 25, 2024. During the proceedings, the circuit court heard testimony from Cores and each of the parties.

¶ 9 *1. Cores's Testimony*

¶ 10 Cores testified that he was first appointed as the children's guardian *ad litem* on September 19, 2023. As part of his general investigation in this case, Cores met with the parties and children

and spoke with numerous other individuals, including Kate Brand, the children's therapist. He also reviewed all the motions and petitions that the parties filed regarding the children.

¶ 11 Following the allocation order, Cores prepared a report on the issue of choice of school for the children, a copy of which was entered into evidence. Cores testified that, in the analysis of his report, he considered all the factors under section 602.5 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Act) (750 ILCS 5/602.5 (West 2024)) that he believed were applicable. The first factor that he considered was the wishes of the children. As to this factor, Cores testified that he never asked the children whether they preferred to attend Downers Grove schools over Lab because he did not want to pressure them. Cores testified that, instead, he asked the children how they felt about Lab and that they expressed how much they liked it. He also testified that he had spoken with Brand when "the case was very high conflict" and that Brand had stated that the children enjoyed Lab and that Lab was a "place of comfort" for them.

¶ 12 Another factor that Cores considered was the children's adjustment to their home, school, and community. Relevant to this factor, Cores noted that the children wanted more downtime in both homes because they were "quite busy." The drive between Anh's Hinsdale home and Lab was 45 minutes "at best" and worse under certain weather and traffic conditions. When attending Lab during Anh's parenting time, the children routinely woke up between 6:30 and 6:45 a.m., left home between 6:45 and 7:05 a.m., and returned home between 7:30 and 7:45 p.m. Corse testified that one of the children had complained that they sometimes ran late or were late when Anh took them to Lab, but that he did not see a school record that showed that the children were chronically late and did not check whose parenting time it was on the days when the children were marked late. Additionally, Corse testified that G.N. had stated that he disliked the commute to Lab and sometimes got tired or carsick but that the commute was not "terrible."

¶ 13 With respect to Sarah's parenting time, Cores explained that, for as long as he had known where Sarah's professional office was located, he had understood the office to be "in very close proximity to [Lab]," but that, according to Brand, the drive between Sarah's Downers Grove home and Lab also "ma[de] for a long day for the kids" and the children wanted downtime to "just be home and *** chill[***] out." Conversely, the travel time between Sarah's home and Fairmount was one minute and the travel time between Anh's home and Fairmount was 11 or 12 minutes. Cores stated that he believed that attending Fairmount would benefit the children in that G.N., who disliked waking up early, could sleep in more and the children could make more friends located in Downers Grove, have a shorter commute, and enjoy more downtime.

¶ 14 Cores testified that, in addition to the commute to and from Lab and the children's desire for more downtime, he also considered the children's after-school activities and the fact that their main friend group was at school. Cores noted that Anh had stated that the children had "very, very close" friends at Lab whom they saw all the time and that two of these friends were individuals with whom the children played squash at the University Club and who did not live in Hinsdale. According to Cores, Anh also stated that the children played with cousins who lived in Hinsdale.

¶ 15 The next factor that Cores considered was the level of each party's parenting participation and past significant decision-making. Cores determined that both parties had been involved in the children's enrollment, but that Sarah had "[taken] the lead" in enrolling the children and clearly did more caretaking. Cores testified that Anh had become more involved after the divorce began.

¶ 16 Cores also considered the wishes of the parties. He testified that he believed that Anh was "strongly in favor" of the children continuing to attend Lab. Cores recounted that he had had a long conversation with Anh in which Anh, who was "very impassioned[and] at times emotional," had expressed how impactful and important Lab had been for the children and would be for their

futures. Cores also stated that he would prefer that the children attend school in Downers Grove, if the parties were in agreement, rather than attend Lab, if parties were not in agreement. Cores explained that this was because he believed that Anh would accept and respect the school selection decision, even if it were adverse to his wishes. Cores did not believe, however, that Sarah would accept or respect an adverse ruling.

¶ 17 In preparing his report, Cores also examined the ratings of the Downers Grove schools and invited the parties to provide him with whatever support they had for their positions regarding choice of school. Based on the information that he had reviewed, Cores determined that the Downers Grove schools were "[e]xcellent" and "A rated or A+ rated in just about every area," though "there might have been like a B+" and he could not say that the schools were at the same level as Lab, which was "far superior." Cores testified that there was nothing that he had learned regarding the Downers Grove schools that concerned him about the children's ability to transition into attendance there.

¶ 18 In generating his ultimate recommendation, Cores further considered the affordability of Lab, but only "really very tangential[ly]" because he was unsure whether the issue was within his province. He noted that the tuition for Lab was $42,000 per year and understood Anh to earn $120,000 per year and Sarah to earn $310,000 per year. Ultimately, Cores recommended that the children attend Downers Grove schools.

¶ 19 *2. Sarah's Testimony*

¶ 20 Sarah testified that she was employed at Friend Health as a physician and chief medical officer, and that she earned $310,000 per year before taxes. As to her personal finances, Sarah also testified that, prior to the parties' separation, they paid $4,000 per month toward her student loans; that she expected to resume paying these loans following the parties' divorce; that her father had

loaned her money to pay toward the $11,999.59 that she had accrued in attorney fees; that she had an open credit card; and that she still owed $501,000 toward the purchase price of her Downers Grove residence.

¶ 21 Sarah testified that she desired to change the children's enrollment from Lab to Fairmount for both "financial and pragmatic" reasons. Related to the consideration of finances, Sarah stated that the tuition for Lab was $40,000 for G.N. and $42,000 for W.N., and that she had stopped paying toward the children's tuition at some point during the 2023-24 school year. Sarah explained that, after she filed her dissolution petition, it became "increasingly *** apparent" to her that she and Anh would struggle to continue paying for Lab because they had separated their households, which increased their costs. Sarah testified that, based on her income, she did not believe that she could afford the cost of Lab.

¶ 22 Regarding her pragmatic considerations, Sarah stated that, as the children aged, their needs regarding friendships, playdates, activities, and homework had changed, and that it was difficult to support these needs in light of the children attending a school as far from them as Lab. Sarah explained, for example, that the children were unable to see their friends from Lab as often as they would have liked because all their friends lived "very far" away in Chicago. She also stated that W.N. spent around an hour and a half to two hours on homework each night. Sarah believed that attending a closer school would help the children, in that they could sleep more, play closer to home with their friends, and have more time to complete their homework and do anything else that they might want to do. Sarah expressed that she would respect the school selection decision, even if it were adverse to her position.

¶ 23 Additionally, Sarah testified that, prior to relocating, she researched potential schools for the children as an alternative to Lab and obtained information from the internet and by "word of

mouth." Sarah explained that, while researching potential schools, she considered factors such as student-teacher ratio, classroom diversity, academic performance, and school ranking. Sarah stated that, based on her research, she believed that the Downers Grove school system was "excellent."

¶ 24 Regarding her parental involvement, Sarah testified that, prior to her and Anh's separation, she usually performed the steps required to enroll the children at Lab each year, which included completing enrollment forms and providing the school with the children's medical information. Sarah further stated that the commute to and from Lab was between 1 hour and 1 hour and 20 minutes when she lived in the marital home in Hinsdale, and between 55 minutes and 1 hour and 10 minutes once she relocated to Downers Grove.

¶ 25 *3. Anh's Testimony*

¶ 26 Anh testified that he had worked as a paid anesthesiologist until November 2011, when he transitioned to working in public service. Anh's most recent job prior to trial was as a global therapeutic head at Asklepios Biopharmaceuticals (Asklepios), where he led a drug franchise. Anh worked for Asklepios until his employment was terminated in May 2024. He testified that he was thereafter building a consulting business through which he already had three clients under contracts that were expected to last at least one to two years. Anh explained that he had so far made between $10,000 and $15,000 per month for his consulting work, expected to make between $350,000 and $450,000 total throughout the 12 months following trial for this same work. He was also applying for a separate role in which he would earn a base salary between $350,000 and $450,000.

¶ 27 As to the cost of the children's enrollment at Lab, Anh testified that Lab offered a payment plan of between $8,000 and $9,000 per month for the cost of the children's enrollment, and that he had paid all amounts due under the plan. Anh explained that he also helped pay the remainder of G.N.'s enrollment fee for the 2023-24 school year, which was around $16,000. He paid the

remainder using $12,000 that his parents gave him and some of his retirement savings. Anh stated that he did not anticipate having to continue to use his retirement savings to pay for the children's enrollment "for the long run" because he expected his income would rise. However, he also stated that he had not paid off his recent credit card debt like he usually did because he wanted to ensure that he had enough money to contribute for the children. Anh believed that he and Sarah would be able to afford the children's continued attendance at Lab because they prioritized the children's education; at the time of trial, Sarah was making "more money *** than she ever [had]"; and his consulting business was growing at a rate that would yield him "more than [enough money] to pay for *** Lab."

¶ 28 Anh testified that, during the months leading up to the trial, he talked directly to the children regarding their schooling. Anh explained that he asked the children how they felt about Lab, their downtime, the commute, and "where their heart [was] about going to Lab."

¶ 29 Anh also testified that he preferred that the children attend Lab rather than Fairmount because Lab offered a progressive education that featured a rigorous curriculum, student-centered learning, and access to University of Chicago resources, whereas public schools were more common-core related and emphasized test taking and memorization. Anh did not know whether Fairmount had the qualities that he believed were common of public schools, but he did investigate the Downers Grove schools and found that Fairmount did not offer any student clubs. At the time of trial, the children did not participate in any student clubs offered by Lab. However, outside of Lab, they did play squash and were members of a robotics team and comedy club. Anh testified that the children saw their friends from Lab outside of school multiple times per week and that the children also had friends who resided near Anh's home.

¶ 30 Regarding his parenting involvement, Anh stated that he personally completed the steps to enroll the children at Lab for the 2024-25 school year and provided Lab with the children's medical information. As to his experience with transporting the children to and from Lab, Anh testified that the commute was around 45 minutes from his Hinsdale residence. Anh also stated that he believed that the commute benefitted the children, and that, during the commute, the children would eat breakfast and they would all listen to podcasts and discuss the podcasts, school, and general topics.

¶ 31 C. Judgment and Notice of Appeal

¶ 32 Following the bench trial, the circuit court entered the judgment for dissolution of marriage as well as a separate order addressing the issue of school selection (school selection order). In its school selection order, the court weighed the factors under section 602.5 of the Act and ultimately ordered the children to be enrolled in the Downers Grove public school system beginning in January 2025. On December 13, 2024, Anh filed a notice of appeal.

¶ 33 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 34 On appeal, Anh argues that the circuit court erred by ordering that the children be enrolled in the Downers Grove public school system. Section 602.5(b)(1) of the Act authorizes the court to allocate parental decision-making responsibility for each significant issue that affects the parties' child, including choice of school. 750 ILCS 5/602.5(b)(1) (West 2024). "The court [must] allocate decision-making responsibilities according to the child's best interests." *Id*. § 602.5(a). In assessing the child's best interests, the court should consider factors that include: (1) "the wishes of the child, taking into account the child's maturity and ability to express reasoned and independent preferences as to decision-making"; (2) "the ability of the parents to cooperate to make decisions, or the level of conflict between the parties that may affect their ability to share decision-making";

(3) “the level of each parent’s participation in past significant decision-making with respect to the child”; (4) “the child’s needs”; and (5) “the distance between the parents’ residences, the cost and difficulty of transporting the child, each parent’s and child’s daily schedules, and the ability of the parents to cooperate in the arrangement.” *Id*. § 602.5(c).

¶ 35 "A reviewing court will not disturb a circuit court’s ruling on the allocation of decision-making responsibilities unless that ruling is against the manifest weight of the evidence.” *Jameson v. Williams*, 2020 IL App (3d) 200048, ¶ 47. “It is no small burden to show that a circuit court’s ruling on decision-making responsibilities is against the manifest weight of the evidence,” which is so only when the opposite conclusion is clearly apparent or the ruling is arbitrary, unreasonable, or not based on evidence. *Id.* ¶ 50; *In re Keyon R.*, 2017 IL App (2d) 160657, ¶ 16. The circuit court is in the best position to evaluate the credibility of witnesses and determine the best interests of the child. *In re Custody of G.L.*, 2017 IL App (1st) 163171, ¶ 24. Thus, when reviewing the court’s ruling, we will not reweigh the evidence or assess witness credibility. *Jameson*, 2020 IL App (3d) 200048, ¶ 51. Nor will we set aside the decision merely because the evidence could have supported a different conclusion. *Id*.

¶ 36 In the school selection order in this case, the circuit court found, in relevant part, that the factors under section 602.5(c) that related to the children’s wishes, the parties’ ability to cooperate, and the level of each party’s past significant decision-making were neutral. The court further found that the factors that related to the children’s needs and the difficulty of transporting the children to and from school both favored Sarah. Anh now argues that each of these findings were against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 37 A. Wishes of the Children

¶ 38 Anh first contends that the circuit court erred by determining that the factor related to the children's wishes was neutral because, in doing so, the court ascribed little weight to the evidence showing that the children expressed a desire to remain enrolled at Lab. Anh argues that the court was obligated to assign more weight to this evidence because it was uncontradicted and further evidence at trial showed that the children were "mature" and their desire was "well-reasoned."

¶ 39 When reviewing a circuit court's ruling regarding the allocation of parental decision-making responsibilities, "[our] function is not to reweigh the evidence *** and set aside the circuit court's decision simply because a different conclusion may have been drawn from the evidence." *Id*. Nevertheless, Anh cites to numerous cases for the proposition that the circuit court was required to give more weight to the evidence of the children's statements that they wanted to remain at Lab. However, all the cases cited by Anh are distinguishable in that they did not involve a parental dispute regarding choice of school for minor children. See generally *In re Marriage of Wycoff*, 266 Ill. App. 3d 408 (1994) (involving child custody proceedings); *In re Marriage of Anderson*, 236 Ill. App. 3d 679 (1992) (involving same). Thus, we will not opine on whether the circuit court should have given more weight to the evidence of the children's express wishes.

¶ 40 However, Anh also argues that the circuit court's findings that the children's wishes were conflicted and that Cores never asked the children whether they preferred Lab over Downers Grove public schools were against the manifest weight of the evidence. We note that Anh's argument in this regard is belied by the record.

¶ 41 At trial, Cores testified that he did not ask the children whether they preferred to attend Lab over Downers Grove public schools because he did not want to pressure them. Cores testified that, instead, he merely asked the children how they felt about Lab and that the children expressed how much they liked the school. He also stated that, on the other hand, G.N. had expressed that he

disliked the commute to and from Lab and sometimes got tired or carsick, and that both children had indicated to their therapist, Brand, that they wanted more downtime in their daily lives. Based on this testimony by Cores, it was not against the manifest weight of the evidence for the circuit court to find that the children's wishes were conflicted and that Cores never specifically asked the children whether they preferred to attend Lab over Downers Grove public schools. Thus, the court properly found that the factor pertaining to the children's wishes was neutral.

¶ 42 B. Ability of the Parties to Cooperate

¶ 43 Anh also contends that the circuit court erred by finding that the factor related to the parties' ability to cooperate was neutral, and by believing that the parties would be able to cooperate after the issue of school selection was resolved. According to Anh, Sarah "never once *** raised any concerns regarding Lab" prior to filing her "eleventh-hour" motion for permission to enroll the children at Fairmount. Anh also asserts that Sarah "manufactured" the conflict regarding choice of school based on "self-interested motivations," and that the circuit court improperly rewarded Sarah for her "bad acts" by ordering that the children be enrolled in the Downers Grove public school system.

¶ 44 In assessing the parties' ability to cooperate in the future, the circuit court noted its earlier allocation order, in which the parties had agreed on all other parenting issues other than choice of school. Additionally, Anh himself appears to agree with the court's observation that the parties "have the ability to cooperate to make most decisions," when he states in his briefs in this appeal that "the parties [have] agreed on other major decisions for their children." Thus, it was not against the manifest weight of the evidence for the court to determine that the parties would be able to cooperate after the issue of school selection was resolved.

¶ 45 As to Sarah's motives for seeking permission to enroll the children in the Downers Grove public school system, she testified at trial that, before deciding where to relocate after leaving the parties' marital home, she first researched potential schools for the children to attend as alternatives to Lab. Sarah explained that, based on her research, she had determined that the Downers Grove public school system was "excellent." Sarah also explained that the children's needs had changed as they aged and that it was difficult to support these needs because of their enrollment at Lab. She stated that she believed that if the children were to attend a school closer to home, then they would benefit from having, for example, more time to do whatever they liked and the ability to play closer to home with friends. On August 1, 2024, Sarah ultimately filed her motion for permission to enroll the children in the Downers Grove public school system.

¶ 46 Although, as Anh points out, Sarah filed her motion on the issue of school selection less than three months prior to trial, the fact remained that neither party agreed with the other's choice of school at the time of the trial. Additionally, although Anh asserts that Sarah acted in bad faith and out of self-interest, her testimony at trial served as evidence from which the circuit court could have found that she sought to enroll the children in the Downers Grove public school system for good-faith reasons related to the interests of the children. Therefore, we will not disturb the court's finding that the factor related to the parties' ability to cooperate was neutral.

¶ 47 C. Past Participation in Significant Decision-Making

¶ 48 Relevant to Anh's next argument, the circuit court found in its school selection order that "the parties [had] jointly participated in [decision-making] regarding schooling in the past," and that, accordingly, the factor related to this consideration was neutral. Anh does not challenge the court's factual finding that he and Sarah had both participated in past decision-making regarding the children's schooling. Rather, he argues that the court incorrectly found that the related factor

was therefore neutral. Anh asserts that the factor instead weighed in his favor because Sarah had agreed to and was actively involved in enrolling the children at Lab for "nearly a decade" prior to her motion to change their enrollment. Anh further asserts that, because of Sarah's past actions, Lab became a source of stability for the children and the court was foreclosed from properly ordering the children to be unenrolled from the school.

¶ 49 To support his present position, Anh cites to *In re Marriage of Alexander*, 231 Ill. App. 3d 950 (1992), and *In re Marriage of Hamilton*, 2019 IL App (5th) 170295. However, neither of these cases involved a parental dispute regarding choice of school for a minor child. See *Hamilton*, 2019 IL App (5th) 170295, ¶ 113-18 (finding that the circuit court properly ordered a parent to contribute to the expenses of his daughter's private high school because sufficient evidence showed that the daughter could not have received an adequate education at a public high school); *Alexander*, 231 Ill. App. 3d at 953-56 (concluding that it was not an abuse of discretion for the circuit court to order a parent to contribute to the costs of his son's parochial school when he never objected to the son's enrollment in the parochial school). Consequently, we find the cases to be inapposite and do not consider them further.

¶ 50 More on point, section 602.5(c)(5) expressly directs the court to consider "the *level* of each parent's participation in past significant decision-making with respect to the child." (Emphasis added.) 750 ILCS 5/602.5(c)(5) (West 2024). Here, although Anh points out that Sarah had earlier agreed to and was actively involved in enrolling the children in Lab, it is unclear how these prior acts are, alone, determinative of her overall level of participation in past decision-making. This is because evidence of Sarah's performance of these acts, while perhaps indicative of the *nature* of her participation in past decision-making, does not, without more, aid the trier-of-fact in determining whether her total participation was greater than, less than, or equal to Anh's. Thus,

the circuit court properly determined that the factor related to the parties' past participation was neutral.

¶ 51 D. Needs of the Children

¶ 52 Also relevant to this appeal, the circuit court found that the factor related to the children's needs weighed in favor of Sarah, partly because it appeared that the parties were unable to afford the cost of Lab. Anh now argues that this finding by the court is erroneous in two respects.

¶ 53 First, Anh contends that the court misapplied the law by considering his and Sarah's ability to afford Lab in the best-interests analysis that it conducted pursuant to section 602.5(c)(8) of the Act. He states that the court should have instead analyzed the issue pursuant to section 505 of the Act. This contention presents a question of law, which we will review *de novo*. See *In re Marriage of Izzo*, 2019 IL App (2d) 180623, ¶ 26 ("To determine whether the trial court applied the wrong legal standard ***, we first identify the correct legal standard, which is a question of law, subject to *de novo* review.").

¶ 54 We reject Anh's argument outright. Section 505 of the Act governs the court's ability to impose child-support obligations. See generally 750 ILCS 5/505 (West 2024). This case does not involve a child-support obligation. Accordingly, we find that the court properly applied section 602.5 to the circumstances of this case.

¶ 55 Second, Anh argues that the court's finding that the parties could not afford Lab was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Anh contends that the evidence showed that the parties could afford Lab, in that they had "amassed a net estate exceeding $970,000" while paying for both Lab and Sarah's schooling; Sarah earned around $300,000 per year; and, at the time of trial, Anh expected to earn between $350,000 and $510,000 in 2024.

¶ 56 Counter to Anh's position, Sarah testified at trial that, although she earned $310,000 per year, she anticipated that she would soon have to resume repaying her student loans, toward which the parties had previously paid $4,000 per month prior to their separation. Sarah also testified that her father had loaned her money to pay for the attorney fees that she had accrued in this case, that she had an open credit card, and that she still owed $501,000 toward the purchase price of her Downers Grove residence. Sarah stated that she did not believe that she could afford to pay for Lab, which cost $40,000 for G.N. and $42,000 for W.N.

¶ 57 As to Anh's own income, he testified at trial that he had stopped working as a paid anesthesiologist in November 2011 and that his employment with Asklepios as a global therapeutic head had been terminated in May 2024. Anh further testified that, at the time of trial, he was still building his own consulting business and applying for paid employment positions. Anh explained that, although he expected to earn between $350,000 and $450,000 total in 2024, he had thus far only made between $10,000 and $15,000 per month that year. Anh also shared that his parents had given him $12,000 and that he had withdrawn from his retirement savings to pay for the children's enrollment at Lab. Anh further shared that, although he typically paid off his credit card debt every month, he had not done so in the recent past because he wanted to ensure that he could care for the children.

¶ 58 In light of the parties' testimony, it was not against the manifest weight of the evidence for the circuit court to find that the parties could not afford the cost of Lab. Nor did the court err in finding that the factor related to the children's needs weighed in favor of Sarah.

¶ 59 E. Cost and Difficulty of Transporting Children

¶ 60 Last, Anh argues that the circuit court's analysis of the factor related to the cost and difficulty of transporting the children "suffered from several deficiencies." Namely, Anh argues

that the court failed to consider evidence of the fact that Sarah "unilaterally increased the distance between the children and [Lab]." Anh asserts that the court also failed to consider evidence of how the children spent the time that it took to commute to and from Lab, that the children did not mind the commute, and that the children sometimes returned home earlier after school on days when they did not have after-school activities.

¶ 61 Notably, Anh does not explain why he believes that the circuit court did not consider the evidence that he indicates. However, based on a review of the record, it seems that his belief is based on the fact that the court did not expressly reference the evidence in its school selection order. "A court need not explicitly mention every piece of evidence that it considers in reaching its decision." *Young v. Herman*, 2018 IL App (4th) 170001, ¶ 68. Thus, we reject Anh's argument suggesting the contrary.

¶ 62 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 63 The judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County is affirmed.

¶ 64 Affirmed.