

FIRST DIVISION  
November 10, 2025

Nos. 1-24-1434, 1-24-2224, 1-24-2234, and 1-24-2611, Consolidated

**NOTICE:** This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

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IN THE  
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS  
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT

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1205 MILWAUKEE LLC,	)	Appeal from the
	)	Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee,	)	Cook County.
	)	
v.	)	Nos. 24 M1 702994
	)	24 M1 703002
	)	
TONY COLE,	)	Honorables
	)	Regina A. Mescall, and
	)	Christ Stacey,
Defendant-Appellant.	)	Judges Presiding.

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JUSTICE HOWSE delivered the judgment of the court.  
Presiding Justice Fitzgerald Smith and Justice Cobbs concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶ 1 *Held*<sup>1</sup>: The judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed; defendant’s briefs in appeal numbers 1-24-1434 and 1-24-2224 fail to comply with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341 resulting in dismissal of the appeals, and the judgments therein are affirmed; to the extent this court can review the issue in appeal number 1-24-2234, defendant failed to demonstrate bias by the trial judge, and the trial court’s judgment denying defendant’s motion to substitute is affirmed; and defendant failed to file a brief in appeal number 1-24-2611 resulting in dismissal of the appeal for want of prosecution and affirmance of the judgment.

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<sup>1</sup> Appeal number 1-24-2234 is hereby taken on appellant’s brief only; and appellant’s August 7, 2025 “Motion to Compel Briefing Schedule and Reassignment to a Panel Pursuant to Rule 22(f)” is hereby denied as moot.

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¶ 2 On February 16, 2024, plaintiff, 1205 Milwaukee LLC, filed a Verified Commercial Eviction Complaint against defendant, Tony Cole, and a business entity that is not a party to this appeal, seeking possession of the first floor and basement of the building located at 1205 Milwaukee, Chicago, IL (the commercial eviction). On February 16, 2024, plaintiff, 1205 Milwaukee LLC, filed a Verified Eviction Complaint against defendants, Tony Cole, Jin Lee, and Unknown Occupants of “1205 N. Milwaukee Ave., Floor 2 Chicago, IL 60642” (the residential eviction). Lee is not a party to this appeal. On July 16, 2024, after a jury trial in the commercial eviction, the circuit court of Cook County entered an eviction order in favor of 1205 Milwaukee LLC and against Cole awarding 1205 Milwaukee LLC possession of the first floor and basement. On December 3, 2024, following a jury trial in the residential eviction, the circuit court of Cook County entered an eviction order granting possession of the second floor of the subject property to plaintiff and ordering defendants to move out on or before December 10, 2024; and, if they do not, ordering the Sheriff’s Office of Cook County to evict defendants. No money damages were claimed in either eviction complaint. Defendant filed multiple appeals from these two proceedings which this court, on its own motion, consolidated for disposition.

¶ 3 For the following reasons, we affirm.

¶ 4 BACKGROUND

¶ 5 This is an eviction case in which plaintiff, 1205 Milwaukee LLC, sought to evict defendant, Tony Cole, from the first-floor commercial space and second-floor residential space in the building located at 1205 N. Milwaukee, Chicago, Illinois. Documents in the record reveal that the subject property has a commercial space on the first floor of the building, in which defendant operated a bicycle rental business. Defendant also used the basement for storage for

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the business. Documents also reveal that defendant and the prior owner of the building previously lived together on the second floor of the property. Although both are named in the respective eviction complaints neither the business nor the former owner of the building are parties in these consolidated appeals. Hereinafter, we will refer to Cole, singularly, as “defendant.”

¶ 6 Defendant filed many pleadings throughout proceedings in both cases. Some of defendant’s filings were substantive motions, many more were purely informational. Defendant also persistently attacked the trial judges assigned to his multiple cases in the circuit court of Cook County (these eviction cases and others). The trial courts entered several orders throughout the litigation, and defendant filed multiple appeals while the two cases were ongoing. Defendant’s separate notices of appeal each list multiple trial court orders. In a separate appeal decided before the consolidation of these appeals, defendant appealed multiple orders and raised issues that are part of the subject matter of this consolidated appeal. We will identify those duplicative matters, which we previously addressed in *1205 Milwaukee v. Cole*, 2024 IL App (1st) 241467-U, as necessary. The orders that are the subject of this appeal are as follows.

¶ 7 Defendant’s notice appeal (NOA) in appeal no. 1-24-1434 is from circuit court of Cook County No. 24 M1 702994, the commercial eviction, and lists the dates of judgments being appealed as June 28, 2024, July 3, 2024, and July 10, 2024. However, the narrative portion of the NOA states that defendant is only seeking relief from the July 3 and July 10, 2024 orders.

¶ 8 Defendant’s NOA in appeal no. 1-24-2224 is from circuit court of Cook County No. 24 M1 703002, the residential eviction, and lists the dates of judgments in that case being appealed as October 15, 2024, October 22, 2024, and November 8, 2024.

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¶ 9 Defendant's NOA in appeal no. 1-24-2234 is from circuit court of Cook County No. 24 M1 703002, the residential eviction, and lists the dates of judgments being appealed as September 26, 2024, September 30, 2024, and October 9, 2024.

¶ 10 Finally, defendant's NOA in appeal no. 1-24-2611 is from circuit court of Cook County No. 24 M1 703002, the residential eviction, and lists the dates of judgments being appealed as December 3, 2024, December 9, 2024, and December 31, 2024.

¶ 11 On February 3, 2025, on this court's own motion, we consolidated the above-listed appeals for disposition.

¶ 12 This appeal followed.

¶ 13 ANALYSIS

¶ 14 We will address the appeals in turn.

¶ 15 APPEAL NO. 1-24-1434

¶ 16 As previously stated, appeal number 1-24-1434 is from the commercial eviction, and the NOA lists the dates of judgments being appealed as June 28, 2024, July 3, 2024, and July 10, 2024. We note that we previously addressed the July 10, 2024, order in *Cole*, 2024 IL App (1st) 241467-U. Defendant filed the NOA on July 11, 2024. The orders listed in the notice of appeal were not final and appealable orders. *Rice v. Burnley*, 230 Ill. App. 3d 987, 990 (1992) ("A final order is one which 'either terminates the litigation between the parties on the merits or disposes of the rights of the parties, either on the entire controversy or a separate branch thereof.'"), *Gateway Auto, Inc. v. Commercial Pallet, Inc.*, 2023 IL App (1st) 230185, ¶ 24 ("A dismissal of the claims in a complaint with prejudice is usually considered a final judgment, although such an

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order is not always immediately appealable.”). Defendant’s appeal did not satisfy any criteria for an interlocutory appeal. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 306 (eff. Oct. 1, 2020), 307 (eff. Nov. 1, 2017).

¶ 17 On July 16, 2024, the trial court entered final judgment in the commercial eviction. On July 22, 2024, the trial court entered an order denying defendant’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Therefore, this court has jurisdiction in this appeal pursuant to Rule 303(a)(2) (“When a timely postjudgment motion has been filed by any party, whether in a jury case or a nonjury case, a notice of appeal filed before the entry of the order disposing of the last pending postjudgment motion \*\*\* becomes effective when the order disposing of said motion or claim is entered.”).

¶ 18 Despite having jurisdiction, defendant’s appeal no. 1-24-1434 is dismissed. “[T]his court may, in its discretion, strike a brief and dismiss an appeal based on the failure to comply with the applicable rules of appellate procedure.” *McCann v. Dart*, 2015 IL App (1st) 141291, ¶ 12.

“Rule 341(h)(7) requires the appellant to present reasoned argument and citation to legal authority and to specific portions of the record in support of his claim of error. Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7). This rule is especially important because, when reviewing a case, the appellate court starts with the presumption that the circuit court’s ruling was in conformity with the law and the facts.” *McCann*, 2015 IL App (1st) 141291, ¶ 15.

¶ 19 Defendant’s brief in this appeal argues that the July 10, 2024 order, as well as the trial judge’s alleged “bias and misconduct,” “compromised [defendant’s] ability to adequately prepare for trial” and “undermined the fairness of the proceedings.” The entirety of defendant’s “argument” in the opening brief lists five alleged errors, states a general proposition of law and

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that the trial court violated that proposition, and cites to one case each purportedly representing that general proposition of law. The argument contains no facts pertaining to the trial court's alleged errors, and consequently no citations to the record, no substantive argument as to how the court's rulings violated the general proposition asserted, and no analysis applying the cited law to this case or how the alleged violation impacted the outcome of defendant's trial.

¶ 20 “[A]ppellants have the burden of showing error in the lower court.” *McGann v. Illinois Hospital Ass’n, Inc.*, 172 Ill. App. 3d 560, 565 (1988). “Bare contentions do not satisfy Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020) and may be rejected for that reason alone.” *Purevdori v. Mission Hills Condominium T-2 Ass’n*, 2024 IL App (1st) 231693, ¶ 29 (citing *Bachman v. General Motors Corp.*, 332 Ill. App. 3d 760, 803 (2002)). “A point raised but not argued or supported by citation to relevant authority fails to satisfy the requirements of Supreme Court Rule 341.” *Bachman*, 332 Ill. App. 3d at 803.

“ ‘[A] reviewing court is entitled to have the issues on appeal clearly defined with pertinent authority cited and a cohesive legal argument presented. The appellate court is not a depository in which the appellant may dump the burden of argument and research.’ [Citation.] Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020) requires a clear statement of contentions with citation of the authorities relied on. This rule is not merely a suggestion, but is necessary for the proper and efficient administration of the courts. [Citation.] We will not complete legal research to find support for this issue. Issues that are ill-defined and insufficiently presented do not satisfy the rule and are considered forfeited.” *Eberhardt v. Village of Tinley Park*, 2024 IL App (1st) 230139, ¶ 60.

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¶ 21 We find that “the argument section of [defendant’s] brief is conclusory and lacks appropriate citations to the record on appeal or to any relevant authority in violation of Rule 341(h)(7).” *Ellis v. Flannery*, 2021 IL App (1st) 201096, ¶ 8. The fact that defendant is acting *pro se* does not relieve defendant of the obligation to comply with our supreme court’s rules governing appellate briefs. *Ellis*, 2021 IL App (1st) 201096, ¶ 8. Defendant has failed to sufficiently inform us of the issues. Compare *id.* The deficiencies in defendant’s brief have completely hindered our review; therefore, defendant’s brief in appeal in number 1-24-1434 is stricken and the appeal is dismissed. *In re Marriage of Reicher*, 2021 IL App (2d) 200454, ¶ 30 (“The striking of a party’s brief and dismissal of the appeal \*\*\* is a harsh sanction, which is ordinarily reserved for the most egregious failures to comply with the rules and those that hinder our review.”). Therefore, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed. *Sutherland v. Phelps*, 22 Ill. 92, 104 (1859) (“The dismissal of an appeal is equivalent to an affirmance of the judgment.”).

¶ 22 APPEAL NO. 1-24-2224

¶ 23 In appeal no. 1-24-2224, defendant seeks review of the trial court’s orders entered on October 15, 2024, October 22, 2024, and November 8, 2024. We note that, although not jurisdictional, the “Jurisdiction Statement” in defendant’s opening brief in this appeal lists three different dates of orders allegedly being appealed. Those dates are September 26, 2024, September 30, 2024, and October 9, 2024. None of those judgments are listed in the NOA, and “[a] notice of appeal confers jurisdiction on a court of review to consider only the judgments or parts of judgments specified in the notice of appeal. [Citations.]” *JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Ass’n v. Ivanov*, 2014 IL App (1st) 133553, ¶ 37. This court does not have jurisdiction over any matters unrelated to the orders listed in the NOA. Therefore, we will not consider those

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arguments. *In re Estate of O'Gara*, 2022 IL App (1st) 210709, ¶ 35 (finding that “first, second, and sixth arguments address issues beyond our jurisdiction. As such, they are dismissed.”).

¶ 24 Defendant filed the NOA in appeal no. 1-24-2224 on November 8, 2024, as an interlocutory appeal, but the appeal did not satisfy any of the criteria in Rule 307. On December 3, 2024, the trial court entered a final eviction order in this case resolving all claims in the litigation. On December 13, 2024, defendant filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. On December 31, 2024, the trial court entered an order denying defendant’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and ruling on other pleadings by defendant. Per the December 31, 2024, order, no timely filed attack on the judgment remained pending.<sup>2</sup> Therefore, this court has jurisdiction pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 303(a)(2) to hear defendant’s appeal.

¶ 25 Turning to the merits of defendant’s appeal, defendant’s only statement in his brief that could possibly be construed to be related to defendant’s dismissed counterclaim for abuse of process, which is the only count the trial court actually dismissed with prejudice in a challenged order, is defendant’s vague statement that this action “appear[s] to be strategically designed to interfere with the Appellant’s pending litigation and to deprive him of his property rights without due process.” This passage contains no citation to relevant authority or relevant parts of the record. The only other passages in defendant’s opening brief that might touch upon any of the

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<sup>2</sup> The order reads:

“All trial matters having now been resolved, the defendant is prohibited from filing any further pleadings of any kind, with the narrow single exception of any notice of appeal and motions related to effectuating an appeal, such as, for example, the motion to stay, the motion for a free transcript \*\*\*, or request for preparation of the record.”



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issues raised in the orders listed in the NOA do not contain citations to relevant portions of the record; so it is impossible to know with any degree of certainty what orders defendant is attacking. Defendant's "arguments" contain no citation to relevant legal authority.

¶ 26 The trial court denied defendant's counterclaims in the underlying case. Defendant's opening brief does not make any argument that defendant's claim for abuse of process is germane in this eviction case and does not make any argument that any of defendant's remaining counterclaims are germane in this eviction case. Defendant does not directly address any alleged counterclaims in any substantive way. These arguments are forfeited. *In re Marriage of Foster*, 2014 IL App (1st) 123078, ¶ 72 ("Failing to cite to relevant facts and authority violates Rule 341 and results in the party forfeiting consideration of the issue." (citing *Kic v. Bianucci*, 2011 IL App (1st) 100622, ¶ 23)).

¶ 27 Defendant's remaining arguments in the opening brief do not directly seek relief from any of the orders listed in defendant's NOA. The "argument" in defendant's brief makes no reference to other topics in the challenged orders: appearance in person at trial, a gas service matter, and discovery issues. Defendant's only reference to discovery is a generic statement that, "[t]he failure to provide pretrial discovery, and the procedural irregularities throughout the case constitute clear violations of established due process protection." None of the other matters referenced in defendant's brief pertain to any orders entered on the dates listed in defendant's NOA in appeal no. 24-2224. *Supra*, ¶ 23.

¶ 28 The foregoing notwithstanding, we do note that defendant's brief in this appeal repeats defendant's claims that the eviction actions against him are retaliatory. Defendant argues that, "The retaliatory nature of these proceedings is further evidenced by the timeline of events." Once

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again, defendant failed to cite to the record, or any pertinent legal authority, or to make appropriate legal arguments on this issue, and defendant's argument is forfeited. Forfeiture aside, defendant has never, including in this appeal, claimed that the eviction resulted from defendant's complaint to governmental authorities regarding violations of building codes, health ordinances, or similar regulations. *General Parking Corp. v. Kimmel*, 79 Ill. App. 3d 883, 887 (1979).

Defendant has failed to cite to any facts to establish a defense of retaliatory eviction.

¶ 29 We also note that defendant's brief repeats defendant's claim he was not properly served in this case. Plaintiff filed the eviction complaint on February 16, 2024. Defendant subsequently filed a document titled "Notice to the Court" in which defendant sought to "provide the court with a clear understanding of recent developments and their implications in the ongoing legal proceedings." This filing did not challenge the trial court's jurisdiction over defendant. Based on defendant's substantive pleading without contesting jurisdiction or requesting an extension of time to answer or otherwise plead, defendant submitted himself to the trial court's *in personam* jurisdiction. 735 ILCS 5/2-301(a-6) (West 2024) ("A party filing any other pleading or motion prior to the filing of a motion objecting to the court's jurisdiction over the party's person as set forth in subsection (a) waives all objections to the court's jurisdiction over the party's person prospectively \*\*\*."). We also note that plaintiff properly served defendant by publication. Any argument defendant was not properly served must fail.

¶ 30 Defendant completely failed to comply with Rule 341(h)(7). *Bachman*, 332 Ill. App. 3d at 803, *Eberhardt*, 2024 IL App (1st) 230139, ¶ 60. "Issues that are ill-defined and insufficiently presented do not satisfy the rule and are considered forfeited." *Eberhardt*, 2024 IL App (1st)

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230139, ¶ 60. Defendant's arguments are forfeited, the appeal is dismissed, and the trial court's judgments in appeal no. 24-2224 are affirmed.

¶ 31 APPEAL NO. 1-24-2234

¶ 32 In appeal number 1-24-2234, defendant's NOA lists the dates of judgments being appealed as September 26, 2024, September 30, 2024, and October 9, 2024. On September 26, 2024, the trial court entered an order denying defendant's motion for substitution of judge for cause. Despite the numerous orders entered on the dates listed in the NOA, defendant's brief in appeal number 1-24-2234 only seeks reversal of the order denying defendant's motion to "disqualify" the trial judge. Any other issues related to the other orders entered on the dates listed in the NOA are forfeited. *Shrock*, 2024 IL App (1st) 230069, ¶ 13 ("Failure to provide argument in the opening brief results in that argument being forfeited." (citing Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020) (" 'Points not argued are forfeited and shall not be raised in the reply brief, in oral argument, or on petition for rehearing.' "))).

¶ 33 "The denial of a motion for substitution of judge for cause is not a final order. [Citation.] Instead, it is an interlocutory order that is appealable on review from a final order. [Citation.]" *Inland Commercial Property Management, Inc. v. HOB I Holding Corp.*, 2015 IL App (1st) 141051, ¶ 19. This court has jurisdiction to review an order denying a request to substitute a judge for cause in an appeal from a final judgment in the case. See *In re Marriage of O'Brien*, 2011 IL 109039, ¶ 23 ("The denial of John's petition to substitute was a step in the procedural progression leading to the final judgment specified in [the] notice of appeal. [Citations.] The appellate court therefore had jurisdiction to review the order."). Defendant filed this appeal as an interlocutory appeal under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 307(a) on November 8, 2024. The trial

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court entered the final judgment in this case on December 3, 2024. On December 31, 2024, the trial court denied defendant's timely postjudgment motion. Therefore, we also have jurisdiction in appeal number 1-24-2234 pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 303(a)(2).

¶ 34 On September 24, 2024, defendant filed a "Motion For Substitution of Judge For Cause" pursuant to section 2-1001(a)(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-1001(a)(3) (West 2024)). In his motion for substitution, defendant argued that the trial judge in this case also presided over a separate case defendant previously filed against an unrelated party, the trial judge dismissed the other case "without adequately addressing the merits," and that the "dismissal was not based on an objective analysis of the facts but instead was influenced by external factors." Defendant admits he filed the motion to "disqualify" the trial judge based on the alleged conduct in the separate case; and defendant argues that the trial judge's actions in the other case constitute "judicial misconduct" that "demonstrates a pattern of abuse of discretion" and "deprived [defendant] of his right to a fair hearing." Defendant argues that the trial judge's conduct in the other case created an "appearance of bias" in this case which "jeopardize[d] the fairness of the trial" in this case. Defendant argues that defendant is not required to prove actual bias; and, based on the appearance of bias, "[t]he failure to disqualify [the trial judge from this case] constitutes a violation of [defendant's] right to a fair trial before an impartial judge" and a violation of defendant's right to due process.

¶ 35 Defendant has not challenged the fact that the trial judge did not refer the motion to substitute for cause to another judge for hearing and has forfeited that issue. Forfeiture aside, we find no error in the trial court's decision to deny the motion without a hearing by another judge. Both on appeal and in defendant's motion to substitute for cause, defendant does not allege any

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extrajudicial source of bias. Rather, defendant's allegations of bias are only based on the trial judge's rulings in the litigation of this and another of defendant's cases related to this litigation.

¶ 36 Our supreme court has held that the fact "that a judge has previously ruled against a party in any particular case would not disqualify the judge from sitting in a subsequent case involving the same party." *In re Marriage of O'Brien*, 2011 IL 109039, ¶ 31. "In any event, the law is clear in Illinois that \*\*\* substitution under section 2-1001(a)(3) may be granted only where the party can establish actual prejudice." *In re Marriage of O'Brien*, 2011 IL 109039, ¶ 31.

"Upon the filing of the petition, 'a hearing to determine whether the cause exists shall be conducted as soon as possible by a judge other than the judge named in the petition.' 735 ILCS 5/2-1001(a)(3)(iii) (West 2010). However, 'a party's right to have a petition for substitution of judge heard by another judge is not automatic.' [Citation.] A judge may deny a petition without referring it to another judge if it fails to meet threshold requirements. [Citation.] Specifically, the trial court may deny the petition if it: \*\*\* (3) alleged bias *not* stemming from an extrajudicial source. [Citation.] In some cases, judges may consider whether the petition was filed in good faith or for purposes of delay, but this 'may require a more complex and nuanced analysis.' [Citation.]" (Emphasis added.) *Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Nichols*, 2013 IL App (1st) 120350, ¶ 8 (citing *In re Estate of Wilson*, 238 Ill. 2d 519, 553 (2010)).

¶ 37 In this case, the trial judge conducted the "more complex and nuanced analysis" to determine whether defendant filed the motion "in good faith or for purposes of delay." After an extensive recitation of defendant's "pattern of willful and contumacious conduct \*\*\* in making

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conclusory, disrespectful and unmeritorious attacks on every judge involved in [defendant's] lawsuits" the trial judge concluded that taking defendant's allegations as true "they would not justify a hearing by another judge." The trial judge found that none of the facts defendant relied upon are extrajudicial, and "[t]hat alone is a basis to deny [the] motion for failing to meet the threshold for conducting an evidentiary hearing on the motion to substitute for cause."

¶ 38 Furthermore, as in *O'Brien*, to the extent the motion to substitute could be considered as a request to recuse, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by not recusing himself. When, as in this case, a party contends that the failure to grant a motion to substitute violates due process, "recusal is required when the 'probability of actual bias on the part of the judge \*\*\* is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.' [Citation.]" *In re Marriage of O'Brien*, 2011 IL 109039, ¶ 32 (citing *Withrow v. Larkin*, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975), *Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.*, 556 U.S. 868 (2009)). We find that defendant's complaints about the trial judge are primarily based on adverse rulings. "[W]hile most bias charges stemming from conduct during trial do not support a finding of actual prejudice, there may be some cases in which the antagonism is so high that it rises to the level of actual prejudice." *In re Marriage of O'Brien*, 2011 IL 109039, ¶ 31.

"Remarks that support such a challenge 'reveal such a high degree of favoritism or antagonism as to make fair judgment impossible.' " *Williams v. Estate of Cole*, 393 Ill. App. 3d 771, 777 (2009).

¶ 39 In this case, as in *Estate of Cole*, we find that "the trial court's rulings and remarks do not rise to [that] level of bias or partiality." *Estate of Cole*, 393 Ill. App. 3d at 777. Furthermore, defendant "makes no argument that the probability of actual bias on the part of [the trial judge] was too high to be constitutionally tolerable." *In re Marriage of O'Brien*, 2011 IL 109039, ¶ 35.

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We do not find any probability of bias on the part of the trial judge. The court's rulings have been detailed and fair in their treatment of defendant's claims. We find no error in the trial court's judgment denying defendant's motion to substitute judge for cause. Moreover, based on our review of the record and defendant's claims, we find that no objective, reasonable person would question the trial judge's ability to rule impartially in this case.

¶ 40 The judgment of the circuit court of Cook County in appeal number 1-24-2234 is affirmed.

¶ 41 Appeal No. 1-24-2611

¶ 42 The NOA lists judgments entered on December 3, 9, and 31, 2024. In addition to the eviction order the trial court entered eight separate orders on December 3, 2024. Defendant has not specified which order(s) defendant seeks to appeal. On December 9, 2024, the trial court entered an order disposing of "all outstanding motions that are still pending" which numbered four motions. Defendant has not specified which orders in the December 9 order defendant seeks to appeal. Finally, on December 31, 2024, the trial court, among other orders, denied defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Defendant has not specified if defendant seeks to appeal any other aspects of the December 31, 2024 order. Regardless, defendant has failed to file a brief in appeal no. 1-24-2611 or to supplement any of defendant's prior arguments with any argument concerning any orders listed in the NOA in appeal no. 1-24-2611.

¶ 43 Therefore, appeal no. 1-24-2611 is dismissed for want of prosecution.

¶ 44 CONCLUSION

¶ 45 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.

¶ 46 Affirmed.